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Multipolarity and the future of
economic regionalism
JORGE F . GARZÓN
German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany
E-mail: jorge.garzon@giga-hamburg.de
This paper inquires into the effects of an emerging multipolar world upon economic
regionalism. While IR scholarship has been making a strong case for the
regionalization of world politics after the end of the ColdWar, the fact that most of the
rising powers are also the sole regional powers of their home regions has led some
scholars to argue that the advent of multipolarity can only strengthen this general
trend towards a more regionalized international order. In this contribution, I challenge
these arguments by proposing an alternative way of thinking about how multipolarity
is developing. The implications of this interpretation are that the emergence of
multipolarity may actually generate powerful centrifugal forces within regions, which
would have adverse effects on well-known forms of complex economic regionalism
that diverse regional groupings have been implementing thus far. This applies
particularly to the global south, where intraregional economic interdependencies tend
to be weak. The proposition is tested through a case study and by examining empirical
ﬁndings across several world regions.
Keywords: multipolarity; emerging powers; regional powers; regionalism;
regional integration; small states
The rise of new powers in the international system is profoundly transform-
ing the environment in which international actors and institutions have to
operate. Aware of the signiﬁcance of these developments, scholars have
already embarked on intense debates about the likely consequences of today’s
global power shifts for the future of a whole range of institutions, norms, and
values of international society, such as the global governance regimes inher-
ited from the post-war era, global peace, and security – primarily the question
of the peaceful rise of China and others – and the universal validity of liberal
visions of world order. Almost at the same time, there has been much talk of
the emergence of a ‘regional architecture of world politics’, and of the
impossibility of understanding the emerging world order without taking the
role of regions into consideration (Acharya 2007, 2014, 84). It is therefore
surprising that the link between an emergent global multipolar constellation
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and regionalism has remained understudied in the literature, especially when
regionalism has been historically very sensitive to the international political
environment in which it unfolded. Fawcett (1995, 2008) and Mansﬁeld and
Milner (1999), for instance, identify several successive waves of regionalism
since the second half of the 19th century, each following quite different logics
as a result from, or adaptation to, radically different international conditions.
Considering that the form and scope of regionalism has varied so widely over
history, it would be unrealistic to expect that in the face of the current global
power shifts, the landscape of world regionalism as depicted by the ‘new
regionalism’ literature of the 1990s will remain unchanged as a permanent
characteristic of the post-Cold War international order.
This article explores the possibilities of regionalism in an increasingly mul-
tipolar world with a particular focus on economic regionalism.1 From the
perspective of International Political Economy (IPE), a particularly relevant
question seems to bewhether the emergence of new economic powers is a force
working in favour of the reorganization of political authority over larger ter-
ritories andmarkets or if, instead, it will foster amore fragmented IPE in away
that perhaps may end shoring up the nation-state as a viable economic unit.
Given the latter, what kind of economic regionalism, if any, will prosper in a
multipolarworld?AsAcharya put it, ‘the rise of China, India, Brazil and others
creates the potential for redeﬁning the purpose of regionalism and the role of
regional institutions, either by strengthening or undermining them’ (2012, 10).
The fact that most of the rising powers are also the sole regional powers
of more or less deﬁned world regions – for instance, South America (Brazil),
Southern Africa (South Africa), the post-Soviet space (Russia), and South
Asia (India) – has led some scholars to assert that the advent of a multipolar
world can only increase the level of political and economic organization of
regions, thereby strengthening a general trend towards a ‘more regionalised
international order’ (Buzan 2011; Acharya 2014). Consequently, many
authors have tended to emphasize the role of regional powers and different
forms of regional leadership as the main drivers of regional transformation
(e.g. Kupchan 1998; Pedersen 2002; Destradi 2010; Prys 2010; Nolte 2011;
Steward-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). Even when such assertions have
remained mostly at the theoretical level and lacked deep empirical
examination, they have become dominant in scholarly and policy circles. In
this contribution, I challenge this interpretation by arguing that the
emergence of multipolarity could actually generate powerful centrifugal
forces within regions that would adversely affect the formation of complex
1 As I elaborate below, an increasingly multipolar world is likely to have different con-
sequences for regionalism in the economic than in the security domain. I would like to thank an
anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to think more thoroughly about this difference.
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forms of economic regionalism. This is due to the distinctive system–region
dynamics generated by the combined operation of global- and unit-level
variables, these variables being the parallel emergence of new economic
powers in different regions of the world, on one hand, and the change that
this new international environment produces in the cost–beneﬁt calcula-
tions informing the strategies of international insertion of smaller states, on
the other. The way these variables play into each other adversely affects the
supply-side conditions of well-known models of economic regionalism that
diverse regional groupings have been pursuing thus far.
In the following pages, I ﬁrst present a review of different visions of
multipolarity and of the role regions might play within this emerging
international system. In the context of this debate, I then propose and
develop an alternative model, which I label decentred multipolarity, which
in my view reﬂects a more realistic pattern of system–region interaction.
Third, by making the most of the explanatory insights gained by the
discipline on the emergence of economic regionalism from a rational-choice
perspective, I discuss how two competing models of multipolarity as an
outside-in variable may impinge on two dominant types of complex
economic regionalism that have traditionally served as blueprints or models
for regional groupings in the developing world and elsewhere – namely,
supranational regional integration and open regionalism. The focus here is
on how different scenarios of multipolarity can affect the structure of
incentives that underpin these two particular types of economic regional-
ism. I share the view that regionalism is a broad term to denote a ‘states-led
project designed to reorganise a particular regional space along deﬁned
political and economic lines’ (Payne and Gamble 1996, 2), but I also con-
tend that these ‘political and economic lines’ may vary substantially across
time and space, giving way to different types of regionalisms that regional
states can establish in order to deal with collective action problems relative
to each other or to their international environment.
In the second part of the paper, I situate these theoretical models and
expectations against the backdrop of real world developments or empirics.
First, I demonstrate how the theorized causal mechanisms of decentred
multipolarity are in operation in South America, a region that until
recently had displayed a different, for several decades stable pattern of
system–region interactions. Second, I trace how these dynamics are
responsible for the unravelling of the complex forms of economic region-
alism set out by South American states in the early 1990s. Finally, I extend
the analysis to other world regions by brieﬂy examining and discussing
aggregated data regarding the evolution of trade regionalization dynamics
(mostly during the last decade) within the home regions of some of the large
states that are widely acknowledged as emerging powers.
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Imagining regions in a post-hegemonic world
Visions of the place regions might hold in a multipolar world have depen-
ded on working hypotheses and conjectures about the actual nature of the
multipolar constellation that is unfolding. A survey of the literature reveals
that the scholarly debate has been revolving around at least two general
models of the role that regions could play in a multipolar world. First, we
can imagine a multipolar world characterized by the ascendance of one or
two new superpowers, which together (and in competition) with the current
superpower would project power across the entire globe similarly to the
way the United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, or
the European empires before them. Within this scenario, regionalism is
expected to follow old historical patterns of what has been called
‘hegemonic regionalism’, which has been deﬁned as when hegemons dis-
cursively deﬁne the boundaries of regions and decisively shape the regional
institutions, security architectures, and regionalization dynamics of their
own regions and of those they penetrate (Acharya 2009, 4, 2014, 82).2
A second model draws heavily on the old notion that, in a world in which
the geopolitics of regions matters, systemic unipolarity can be replaced by
multipolarity only by means of ‘regional uniﬁcation or the emergence of
strong regional unipolarities’ (Wohlforth 1999, 30). This paradigm seems
to have captured the imagination of prominent scholars. For instance,
Buzan argued that the most likely end scenario for an international system
in transition is the advent of a world order with ‘no superpowers but several
great powers’ (Buzan 2011, 16–17). This means that, via a progressive
weakening of the United States and the inability of the currently most
obvious superpower candidates (China and the European Union) to
surmount the formidable obstacles standing in their way, no state will be
able to project power throughout many regions or the whole international
system. The natural outcome of this development would be a ‘more
regionalised international order’ because the removal of the superpower
overlay would automatically increase the inﬂuence of regional (great)
2 A good example of ‘hegemonic regionalism’ (or also externally promoted regionalism) is
provided by Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002). After the Second World War, the wide power
preponderance of the United States relative to Europe and Southeast Asia permitted the
superpower to shape European and Southeast Asian regionalism according to its own policy
preferences. US policy determined both regions’ respective security architectures opting for
multilateralism in Europe and for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia. The
United States also discursively deﬁned the boundaries of both regions by constructing the
previously inexistent notion of ‘North Atlantic region’ and by redrawing the lines of a more or
less coherent ‘Southeast Asian region’ above what was previously known as a bundle of unrelated
states called ‘Indo-China’.
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powers in their home regions (Buzan 2004, 143). Unlike superpowers,
regional (great) powers lack the necessary means to project substantial
power beyond their own regions (with the exception possibly of proximate
regions lacking strong protective regional powers). Therefore, they would
use their superior material capabilities primarily to build strong regional
orders or ‘zones of inﬂuence’ around them. Similarly, and perhaps more
straightforwardly, Acharya (2009, 7) contends that the coming world can
be better described as one of ‘regiopolarity’ rather than multipolarity. The
logic underpinning this proposition is analogous to that of Buzan’s in the
sense that Acharya also expects emerging powers ‘to remain fundamentally
embedded in their regional strategic and economic contexts’ and unlikely to
become true global powers (Acharya 2014, 85–86). According to him, ‘in
such a world, regions are likely to test the limits of power projection by the
old or the rising powers’ since ‘no great power […] will have the ability to
have its say over distant regions because of the countervailing local inﬂu-
ence of the regionally dominant powers’ or regional hegemons (Acharya
2009, 6, 2014, 86).3
Even though these two different interpretations have been circulating for
a while, it is not clear whether there is an actual theoretical debate among
them. Recent international developments like the EU’s profound ﬁnancial
crisis, China’s economic slowdown and its inability to make allies beyond
small and poor countries and, most important, a noticeable decline in the
ability of the United States to shape regional orders in most regions, have
rendered the ﬁrst scenario increasingly unlikely and, therefore, less popular
among scholars.4 The second interpretation, by contrast, has not only
remained unchallenged but has diffused widely among scholars and
policymakers. This level of diffusion is not surprising since it establishes a
very plausible and straightforward causal mechanism between (a) shifts in
material power at the global level and (b) regional outcomes, which is based
on a few assumptions about the geopolitics of regions as relatively effective
power insulators and the nature of ‘power projection’. The logic of this
paradigm can be summarized as follows: as some of the emerging powers
are also the sole regional powers of more or less clearly deﬁned geopolitical
regions (such as South America, the post-Soviet space, Southern Africa, and
South and Southeast Asia), they will increasingly reorder their regions
around their regionally preponderant power in a kind of ‘hub-and-spoke’
pattern of economic and political inﬂuence, at the same time as they
3 For Acharya the real question is whether regiopolarity will give rise to regional hegemonies
or to more institutionalized regional arrangements like the EU. For a detailed account of the
different types of regional orders that can emerge from regional unipolarities see Garzón (2014).
4 For instance, Buzan (2011) and Etzioni (2013) discard it altogether.
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successfully protect their regions from extraregional intrusion.5 This latter
task will be less costly as the power projection capabilities of the established
great powers decline. Relatively insulated from global-level power
inﬂuences, these large ‘region-states’ may therefore adopt a variety
of internal forms of political organization, such as ‘old-style spheres of
inﬂuence, hegemonically centered institutionalism, and unequal forms of
federal union’ (Hurrell 2007, 141).
Decentred multipolarity: an alternative system–region interaction model
As mentioned above, the persuasive logic of the second proposition con-
cerning the place of regions within a multipolar world (which, for practi-
cality, I will refer henceforth to as regiopolarity) has remained
unchallenged. In this section, I argue that the emerging multipolar conﬁg-
uration might be transiting towards an alternative scenario that can be
conceived of in terms of a crisscrossing, decentred multipolar constellation.
It may be easier to explain this concept by bringing in its main differences
relative to the regiopolarity model into the foreground. In contrast to
regiopolarity, within decentred multipolarity the bulk of the regional
political and economic linkages among states (and therefore inﬂuence) does
not end up converging in the core regional (great) power in a kind of
hub-and-spoke structure. Instead, these linkages transcend the region in all
directions in which signiﬁcant extraregional power concentrations tune in
to regional actors in ever-shifting issue areas of cooperation and exchange.
The causal mechanism that produces this outcome can be found in
the combined operation of global- and unit-level variables, which are the
simultaneous emergence of new poles of power in different regions of the
world, and the propensity of smaller states to engage in an adaptive form of
foreign policy behaviour that seeks to minimize political costs while
accessing the external resources they need – such as markets, investments,
and aid.6
With regard to changes in global-level variables, the rise of new poles of
power in the international system also means, from a regional outside-in
perspective, a larger number of more or less powerful states with the
capacity, and arguably the will, to project (economic) power (with varying
5 This outcome is, of course, not expected in regions containing more than one regional
power such as theMiddle East or East Asia, since the order-producing virtues attributed to power
asymmetry would be nulliﬁed.
6 I believe the term decentred multipolarity accurately captures the idea of a multipolar
constellation in which the political and economic interactions of most non-polar states do not
tend to cluster around the poles, as was the case, for instance, during Cold War bipolarity.
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levels of intensity, depending on their capabilities) into one or more world
regions. Here, decentred multipolarity mends two ﬂaws of the regiopolarity
model. First, there is no reason to assume that these powers may not have
(or may not develop in the future) a range of extraregional interests such as
accessing scarce natural resources, seeking the political support of other
states in international organizations, opening new outlet markets for their
products, or even the often unspoken political goal of offsetting the
advancements of another (rival) power. As the interests of emerging powers
expand in tandem with their material capabilities (Zakaria 1999), there is
no a priori reason to assume that these interests will be deﬁned in a
narrower regional manner, especially given the current degree of
interdependencies in a broad range of global policy issues. As a matter of
fact, mounting empirical evidence shows that emerging powers are
increasingly operating in multiple regions. As Etzioni (2013, 27) observes
with regard to Russia:
Russia continues to seek to play a role in all regions of the world, despite
its relative weakness as a power. It strongly supports the Assad regime in
Syria, actively participated in the six-party talks with North Korea, sought
to improve its relations with China, cooperates with Japan in the area of
energy, and has increased its sphere of inﬂuence in Africa […] All this
shows that, unlike other powers who tend to limit their inﬂuence to their
own region, Russia has extended its reach to almost every corner of
the globe.7
What Etzioni identiﬁed as an anomaly in his model of ‘devolution’,8 has
in the meanwhile become common practice for almost all emerging powers.
Chinese economic power projection reaches not only nearby areas or weak
points of resistance such as Central Asia or Africa but also Latin America
and even Europe (Pavlicevic 2015). Brazil is transferring important
economic resources to Africa in the form of loans and development assis-
tance (Stolte 2012), and India is just beginning to play the same game
(Destradi and Küssner 2013).
Second, proponents of regiopolarity have tended to view ‘power
projection’ in very absolute terms. According to this interpretation, only
superpowers or also ‘global powers’ are able to project power throughout
7 As the direct successor of the Soviet Union, Russia is certainly a different kind of ‘emerging
power’ than India or Brazil, and its economy has of late rather been in decline. But as Lukyanov
(2016) has recently argued, the Kremlin has concluded that in order to counteract the costs of its
difﬁcult situation, it must play globally.
8 Etzioni’s (2013) model of ‘devolution’ and ‘regional pluralism’ is another version of the
regiopolarity paradigm.
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the entire international system, great powers could do so to more than one
region, and all the remaining states would have only a regional reach
(Buzan and Waever 2003; Buzan 2004). In practice, however, power
projection varies considerably as much in terms of the instruments
employed as in intensity. An extreme form of power projection is certainly a
full-ﬂedged military intervention such as that undertaken by the United
States in Iraq in 2003. The amount of military and economic resources that
the United States was able to project towards this distant country eventually
changed the structure of Middle Eastern regional order and had the
potential (via the now-failed post-conﬂict state building plans) to funda-
mentally transform the targeted societies. Such an intense form of power
projection can certainly only be undertaken by a healthy superpower.
Weaker states playing in a different league such as middle powers may also
be able to project resources towards the extraregional world through
alternative instruments and with lower levels of intensity – like, for
instance, the way Brazil decided to direct more than half of its technical
cooperation resources to Africa (Stolte 2012). Brazil is certainly not a great
power but this condition does not prevent it from projecting (economic)
power to distant regions and thereby having an impact on other societies
overseas. Therefore, superpower or great power status is not a prerequisite
for projecting power extraregionally. Power projection is a function of the
amount of resources that large states usually manage to allocate to their
different foreign policy instruments precisely by virtue of the economies of
scale that their demographics (in combination with their level of develop-
ment) permit them to achieve. Power projection is also a function of
political will. As mentioned above, even a weak power such as Russia can
have a global reach if its foreign policy elites calculate that it is worth to
invest a higher share of their limited national resources (and therefore
necessarily diverted from other valuable domestic policy goals) to pursue an
active foreign policy on a multiregional scale. Finally, the cost of power
projection over large distances varies according to the instruments
employed. Military interventions are usually very costly, less so loans,
foreign aid or joint investment funds.9
9 Note that as a system–region interaction model, decentred multipolarity does not necessa-
rily need a precise structural deﬁnition of multipolarity at the global level in the sense of having to
determine which states qualify as great powers and which do not in a quasi-Waltzian way. The
current international system may be described by some as containing one superpower, three or
possibly four great powers, and perhaps eight to ten regional (or middle) powers, or it may be
characterized differently depending on the criteria used to categorize these states. What is
important for the model is that several powerful states (some certainly more powerful than
others) choose to project their power to distant regions in pursuit of their interests. Thus, the
concept of decentred multipolarity does not claim to be an accurate representation of the current
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A third important difference pertains to the geopolitical function
assigned to regions. Like the regiopolarity scenario, the region also plays a
geopolitical role in decentred multipolarity in terms of diminishing or
ﬁltering out the power being projected ‘into’ it by virtue of both geography
(or distance) and, primarily, the resistance that regional states can coordi-
nate or mount to repel such inﬂuences. Within this model, however, neither
of these checks really works as effective ‘power insulator’ from global-level
inﬂuences. Distance is the weakest insulator of the two as most of the
instruments of foreign policy employed for power projection, especially
economic and diplomatic statecraft, easily surmount large distances. Only
in the military ﬁeld can geography prove a formidable obstacle if a state
lacks substantial force projection capabilities. More relevant seems what
regional states are able to do to either welcome or repel the projection of
power coming from the extraregional world. In this respect, regional states
can act on an individual or a collective basis. With regard to individual or
unilateral state actions, what comes to mind ﬁrst is the key role often
ascribed to local regional (great) powers by proponents of regiopolarity in
driving extraregional inﬂuences away from their home regions (e.g. Prys
2010, 499; Steward-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 11). Conceding that
regional (great) powers have an interest in doing so, when it comes to
practice, it is difﬁcult to imagine how, in the absence of ColdWar-like levels
of securitization, a regional (great) power could prevent other regional
states from welcoming the involvement of extraregional actors or from
establishing economic and political linkages with the latter or even
becoming outright regional gateways for deeper extraregional penetration.
As the case of India demonstrates, even when regional (great) powers
actively securitize their own regions, they cannot completely suppress
smaller states’ bids to pull out, especially if there is an external power ready
to assist them (Destradi 2012). Therefore, under the current levels of
securitization in the international system, state action as an insulator from
extraregional inﬂuences may only be effective if it is agreed upon and there
is a certain level of regional interstate coordination.
On the other side of the causal mechanism that makes decentred multi-
polarity work, the availability of more potential extraregional partners
with the capacity and will to pursue different extraregional interests can
considerably alter the cost–beneﬁt calculations informing the strategies that
smaller states usually follow in order to attain key foreign policy goals. The
adaptive foreign policy behaviour of smaller states can be conceived of as
or near-future distribution of capabilities, but instead describes how the emergence of a more
decentralized distribution of power is likely to affect regions.
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the constant search for an acceptable point of equilibrium or trade-off
between the often mutually exclusive goals of accessing external resources
and preserving political autonomy (Handel 1990, 121–22). Thus, under
conditions of multipolarity in a multiregional international system, smaller
regional states may prefer the relatively low political costs of cooperating
and exchanging with distant powers over closely engaging with the neigh-
bouring regional (great) power; the latter may not only be bad business in
the sense of forfeiting diversiﬁcation of economic linkages, but may also
entail potential long-term political costs in terms of asymmetric economic
dependency and the consequent loss of freedom of action to pursue the
preferred range of policies. In Keohane and Nye’s (2001) terminology
(see also Nye 2011, 53–55), multipolarity provides lesser states with
the opportunity and the incentives to make a bid to manipulate the
‘asymmetries of interdependence’ to their own advantage, not only to reap
material gains but also to deny more powerful actors the exercise of
economic (and other kinds of) power over them. In this sense, as a con-
sequence of the interplay of global-level variables (the emergence of new
poles of power) and unit-level variables (disequilibria in the cost–beneﬁt
calculations of smaller states’ strategies), multipolarity as an outside-in
force with respect to regions may not prompt less powerful regional states
to gravitate around the regional preponderance of their local regional
(great) power. Quite the contrary: it might actually be the source of
powerful centrifugal forces within regions conspicuously militating against
the formation of strong regional unipolarities.
This, of course, does not mean that smaller states avoid cooperation or
exchange with their local regional (great) power. Regional (great) powers
are likely to remain important trade and political partners for the smaller
states of their own regions in any multipolarity scenario. Within decentred
multipolarity, however, they become just one pole among others. Regional
(great) powers may or may not decide to use their superior material cap-
abilities to attempt to create strong regional orders around them. If they do
(complying thus with the behavioural pattern expected by proponents of
regiopolarity), my expectation is that they will ﬁnd this task more and more
difﬁcult to accomplish as they will have to implement their policies within
an international environment in which the compounded variables of
decentred multipolarity are in operation (Table 1).
Multipolarity and the future of economic regionalism
This section examines the potential consequences for economic regionalism
of these two competing models of multipolarity as an outside-in variable.
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Table 1. Multipolarity scenarios and their effects on the conﬁguration of regions
Multipolarity model Relevant actors Power projection Role of regions Regional outcome
Two or three superpowers Superpowers (also
referred to as ‘global
powers’)
Throughout the whole
international system
Passive objects of
superpowers’ policies
Hegemonic regionalism
(hegemons deﬁne the
boundaries of regions,
shape the regional
institutions, security
architectures, and
regionalization
dynamics)
Regiopolarity Regional (great) powers Limited capabilities and
will to project power to
distant regions. Power
therefore primarily used
to build strong regional
orders
Geography or distance is a
relatively effective power
insulator
Cohesive regional orders,
eventually taking the
form of (moderately)
deep or tight forms of
economic regionalism
Protective regional (great)
powers effectively deﬂect
unwanted extraregional
power projection into their
home regions
Decentred multipolarity Declining superpower,
traditional great
powers, rising powers,
some assertive middle
powers
To one or more regions,
depending on the
extraregional interests
of these various types of
large states
Geography is not an effective
power insulator (especially
for economic and
diplomatic statecraft)
Shallow forms of
economic regionalism
(e.g. simple free trade
areas). In general, more
ﬂexible and porous
forms of regionalism
Large states in general
with sufﬁcient
demographics to yield
economies of scale in
their different foreign
policy instruments
With different foreign
policy instruments and
varying levels of
intensity depending on
these large states’
relative capabilities and
their readiness to divert
(limited) national
resources to pursue
assertive foreign
policies in multiple
regions
Regional (great) powers are
ineffective power deﬂectors
Porosity of regions is increased
by the altered cost–beneﬁt
calculations informing
smaller regional states’
foreign policy strategies,
which prefer the relatively
low political costs of
cooperating and exchanging
with distant powers over
close engagement with their
local regional (great) power
M
ultipolarity
and
the
future
of
econom
ic
regionalism
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I circumscribe my argument to economic regionalism because the
centrifugal dynamics of decentred multipolarity are likely to operate with
more intensity in the economic sphere. This is due to the above-mentioned
greater effectiveness of geography (or distance) in increasing the costs of
extraregional power projection in the military ﬁeld –whereas economic and
diplomatic statecraft can easily surmount large distances, and are also less
prone to become the objects of securitization. The main reason, however,
that suggests that the trajectories of economic and security regionalism are
likely to diverge in a multipolar world is that the interdependencies that
motivate the emergence and maintenance of security regional arrangements
remain for their most part linked to local security externalities (Lake and
Morgan 1997; Buzan and Waever 2003).10
The sophistication of economic regionalism has been often regarded as
reﬂecting the cohesiveness of regions. From a rational/institutionalist per-
spective, the sophistication of economic regionalism can be operationalized
in terms of what has been called its ‘depth’ or level of policy coordination
complexity. This may range from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep’ regionalist arrange-
ments (Hancock 2009, 6). Free trade agreements (FTAs), in which states
have to coordinate tariff rates only relative to each other but not relative to
outsiders, are examples of shallow regionalism – that is, the policy coordi-
nation problem is minimal.11 Supranational integration agreements and
customs unions are examples of (moderately) deep or tight regionalism. In
these cases, the policy coordination problem is more complex. In supra-
national integration states decide ﬁrst to delegate political authority to a
supranational body and then to submit to the norms and regulations ema-
nating from it. In customs unions states have to coordinate tariff rates not
only relative to each other but also relative to outsiders. It is the emergence
and spread of these relatively complex types of economic regionalism that
have drawn the most attention of scholars and inspired the general positive
outlook about the possibilities of regionalization and regional consolida-
tion after the Cold War (Fawcett 2008). The following analysis focusses
therefore on how the models of multipolarity presented above may affect
10 Relatively new developments speak in favour of this view. The creation the South
American Defence Council and the Shangai Cooperation Organisation, as well as the recent
strengthening of security cooperation in the Southern African Development Community and the
Gulf Cooperation Council were all institutional developments linked to the necessity to deal with
local security externalities.
11 Garnaut (1996, 31), for instance, observes that in a ‘shallow’ regional agreement such as
the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), there is ‘no requirement of cooperation, and
therefore no necessary costs of organization and enforcement, no free rider problem, and no need
for a hegemonic leader’.
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the structure of incentives that makes these forms of (moderately) deep or
tight economic regionalism possible.
From a rational-choice perspective, two well-accepted theories have been
developed in the ﬁeld of IPE to account for the emergence of real world
instances of different types of complex economic regionalism: Mattli’s
‘regional integration theory’ (1999) and ‘open regionalism theory’ (also
known as the rationalist variant of the ‘new regionalism’ literature).
I choose these two theories for two important reasons: ﬁrst, unlike most
endogenous or inside-out approaches to regionalism – which often emerge
from a single regional integration experience – both of them more or less
specify the (international) political parameters that are ‘common to
most cases’ (Mattli 1999, 17) in which economic regionalism develops.
Accordingly, both have been applied to explain the emergence of economic
regionalism (often comparatively) in different regional contexts.12 Second,
and most importantly, though with different emphases, each theory
conceives of its respective strand of regionalism as the outcome of a given
structure of incentives that regional states face with respect to each other as
well as to their international environment. This is important because
(setting aside the question of why a regional grouping of states would
choose to embark upon either of these strategies in the ﬁrst place) the
structure of incentives relates directly to the conditions under which such
strategies are more or less likely to succeed.
Following Haas, (supranational) regional integration can be deﬁned
parsimoniously as a strategy by which nation-states decide to ‘voluntarily
mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attri-
butes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conﬂicts
among themselves’ (1970, 610). That is, supranational regional integration
is a particular type of regionalism in which regional states set up suprana-
tional institutions to which ‘political authority’ or ‘parcels of sovereignty’
over ‘key areas of domestic regulation and policy’ are delegated (Mattli
1999, 41; see also Börzel 2012, 508). In practice, most regional groupings
that have pursued a strategy of supranational integration have sought to
reap economic gains. Open regionalism, on the other hand, can be concisely
deﬁned as the use of regional ‘preferential integration agreements and […]
other policies in a context of [external] liberalisation and deregulation,
geared towards enhancing the competitiveness of the countries of the region’
(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 1994, 8).
12 Mattli (1999) uses his theory to explain integration and ‘non-integration’ in Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and North America. Open regionalism theory has been especially applied to
explain the emergence of regional economic agreements in the global south as a response to
globalization after the Cold War (e.g. Grugel and Hout 1999).
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In open regionalism, regional states band together to form a larger market
not so much in pursuit of the direct gains of trade among each other but as
part of an outward-looking strategy to insert themselves under better
conditions into the world economy, primarily by using the structural
advantages of a bigger integrated market to enhance both: their attractive-
ness to foreign investors and their bargaining clout in international trade
negotiations with third parties.
Multipolarity and supranational regional integration
The most important consequence of the values in the global- and unit-level
variables bringing about decentred multipolarity is that they logically
countervail the values of some key variables that rational-choice theories of
regional integration have identiﬁed as contributing to a successful strategy
of supranational regional integration. Mattli identiﬁed two sets of neces-
sary conditions for successful supranational integration: demand and sup-
ply conditions. Echoing well-known neofunctionalist arguments, ‘demand
conditions’ refer to the potential gains of market exchange within a region.
These potential gains must be perceived as high enough to generate a strong
demand for integrated governance structures in the form of regional rules,
regulation and policies. Generally, cross-border transaction costs are likely
to take a heavier toll on ﬁrms if there is already a relatively dense network
of market exchange among countries. ‘Supply conditions’ refer to the
‘conditions under which political leaders are willing and able to accom-
modate demands for functional integration’ (Mattli 1999, 50). According
to Mattli, there are two types of ‘strong’ supply conditions for integration.
The ﬁrst relates to the readiness of governments to incur the costs of inte-
gration in terms of sacriﬁcing political autonomy to supranational agents
for the prospective gains in terms of enhanced economic performance for
their polities. Speciﬁcally, the expected economic gains must be signiﬁcant
enough to offset losses in political autonomy. The second condition refers
to the presence of an undisputed regional leader with sufﬁcient resources to
use side payments and cost internalization to ease the inevitable distribu-
tional conﬂicts emerging among states when attempting to integrate.
Ceteris paribus, the dynamics of decentred multipolarity are likely to
adversely affect the ﬁrst strong supply condition identiﬁed by Mattli by
providing governments of smaller regional states with more opportunities
to pursue trade and other kinds of resource exchanges with extraregional
partners, thereby reducing the incentives to incur the political costs of
integration with neighbours by delegating sovereignty to supranational
bodies. If we adhere to the logic of theoretical approaches emphasizing the
role of strong states or regional powers in promoting regional integration
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(e.g. Pedersen 2002) – that is, the second strong condition – at least
decentred multipolarity raises the ceiling of the resources that powerful
states must mobilize if they are to build attractive integration schemes.
Thus, by affecting supply-side conditions, an emergent multipolar con-
stellation resembling the decentred multipolarity model is likely to make a
strategy of supranational regional integration more difﬁcult to implement.
By the same logic, the development of a regiopolarity scenario would also
affect Mattli’s ﬁrst strong supply condition for integration, but this time
positively. By assuming that major powers cannot or choose not to project
economic power to distant regions, within this model smaller regional
states could not easily establish signiﬁcant economic linkages with extra-
regional powers, leaving them with no choice but to seek economic inte-
gration with their local regional (great) power. This is reminiscent of a
situation (very often assumed by scholars) in which regional integration is
occurring within a political vacuum. By the same token, the material
incentives that regional powers must mobilize in order to build attractive
integration schemes would have a lower ceiling, which would positively
inﬂuence the second strong supply condition. From a longer-term
perspective, one could also even hypothesize that, due to the cumulative
effect of trade and investment diversion, regionalization dynamics might
grow stronger over time, thereby also affecting demand-side conditions of
integration. Thus, contrary to decentred multipolarity, regiopolarity may
positively affect the values of the condition variables that make a strategy of
supranational regional integration more likely to succeed.
Multipolarity and open regionalism
Rational-choice theories of the ‘new regionalism’ conceived of open
regionalism as an outward-oriented strategy devised by developing coun-
tries to attain two important goals simultaneously: to attract market-
seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) and to enhance their bargaining
power in international trade negotiations (Ethier 1998; Fernández and
Portes 1998, 211; Mansﬁeld and Milner 1999, 614). In open regionalism,
the ultimate goal of clustering the national markets of different states is less
about fostering intraregional trade among them and more about forming a
larger market that could prove more attractive for market-seeking investors
from abroad. First, it was hoped that a larger market would increase the
economic viability of many lumpy investments (Fernández and Portes
1998, 202) – that is, investments that only make economic sense above a
certain size. Second, the prospect of a larger consumer market should lure
extraregional exporters to ‘jump’ the regional agreement’s external tariff by
investing in manufacturing facilities inside the customs union. At the same
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time, the bargaining chip of allowing access to this larger market – or the
threat of denying it – might allow member states to strike better deals in
trade negotiations with third parties if they negotiate collectively.
However, the structure of incentives underpinning this sort of complex
economic regionalism rests on two important assumptions. First, it pre-
supposes that the distribution of (low) bargaining leverage is more or less
even among the regional states trying to cooperate. That is, if the market of
one of the member states were to become considerably larger than those of
its regional partners, this state may, in theory, be able on its own to attract
large amounts of market-seeking FDI or strike advantageous deals in
international trade negotiations with third parties. Second, it assumes that
extraregional partners, at least in principle, agree to negotiate with the
regional grouping as a whole and abstain from pursuing a selective bilateral
strategy.
Under a multipolar conﬁguration showing the traces of decentred mul-
tipolarity, it is not clear whether both of the above premises would still hold
with the same strength as they once did, at least in world regions har-
bouring an emerging regional (great) power. On one hand, as these rising
states increase their share of the regional market, their incentives to use this
newly gained market leverage in a more independent manner, either to
attract market-seeking investments or to negotiate favourable trade agree-
ments with extraregional partners, may prove very difﬁcult to resist.
Anticipating a situation in which the local regional (great) power ends up
capturing a disproportionate share of the incoming FDI to the region,
smaller regional states may in turn lose interest in participating in open
regionalism. On the other hand, as emerging powers project their economic
power to distant regions, they are interested in making the most of their
bargaining leverage. This increases their incentives to deal with individual
countries instead of regional groupings; more so if they face a certain level
of competition from other extraregional powers attempting to seize eco-
nomic opportunities within the same target region.
The issue of the asymmetrical distribution of bargaining leverage does
not appear to be solved within the regiopolarity model either, so the use of
the regional market as a bargaining tool remains more in the realm of the
regional powers’ foreign economic policies than in any real interstate
coordination game. However, since in this model smaller regional states
have less opportunity to develop signiﬁcant economic and political linkages
with extraregional powers – due to the latters’ inability or unwillingness to
project (economic) power – their bargaining leverage is likely to be very
low, so that their loyal adherence to the regional project, and the privileged
access to the regional power’s market that their membership in the regional
agreement should guarantee may be the only sources of their ability to draw
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FDI, as is common in cases of ‘north–south regionalism’ (Fernández and
Portes 1998, 211). This would ease the collective action problem of having
to agree on an open regionalist strategy. Furthermore, less pressure and
cajoling on the part of extraregional powers may, in principle, give regional
states more time and space to coordinate common positions in their deal-
ings with extraregional actors.
Hence, the combination of an asymmetrical distribution of market
leverage within a region and the presence of multiple extraregional powers
competing to grab economic opportunities within the same region is likely
to render strategies of open regionalism more difﬁcult to coordinate. The
removal of this last variable within the regiopolarity scenario improves this
strategy’s prospects of success relative to decentred multipolarity.
The dynamics of decentred multipolarity: South America’s shifting
patterns of international alignments
The proposition that emerging powers are increasingly projecting their
economic power towards distant regions has been substantiated bymultiple
recent case studies on the foreign policy behaviour of these states (e.g.
Buszynski 2006; Roett and Paz 2008; Mawdsley and McCann 2011; Stolte
2012; Destradi and Küssner 2013; Pavlicevic 2015). What has been less in
the focus of attention is how this pattern of behaviour is altering the cost–
beneﬁt calculations that inform the foreign policy strategies of smaller
states. I argued that the perception of these changes at the systemic level is
moving smaller regional states to prefer the relatively low political costs of
cooperating and exchanging with distant powers over close engagement
with their local regional (great) power. In the following, I demonstrate how
this unit-level component of the causal mechanism of decentred multi-
polarity is operating in the case of the South American region. South
America is a hard case for this proposition since US hegemony, especially
during the Cold War, has historically prevented extraregional powers from
meddling in regional affairs. As a consequence, South America never
featured the patterns of extraregional power penetration that other world
regions such as Southeast Asia or the Middle East do. This more or less
hierarchically organized regional order endured throughout the 1990s even
after the constraints of the Cold War had vanished (Hurrell 2005).
Geopolitically, South America is also a clearly unipolar region in which
Brazil concentrates nearly 50% of the regional population and 60% of the
regional nominal GDP (Garzón 2014). The United States and Brazil
constitute therefore the two natural poles around which smaller South
American states should gravitate. The selected small- and medium-sized
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South American states – namely, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru – constitute also hard cases themselves: ﬁrst, these states are not
regional powers, nor do they perceive themselves as such in terms of pos-
sessing the resources to pursue active foreign policies on a multiregional
scale, as oil-rich Venezuela until recently did. Second, none of these states is
acknowledged as having a long-standing proﬁle of ‘trader state’ in the sense
of having traditionally privileged integration into the extraregional world
as, most prominently, Chile has. Instead, due to their small size and
geographical position, all used to subscribe to regional integration as the
keystone of their strategies of international insertion. Thus, in terms of both
relative power and geographical remoteness from the most important
world markets, they can be considered as the least suited regional candi-
dates to follow cross-regional international strategies. However, this is
precisely what they have tried to do in recent years.
Peru and Colombia
Being the largest and geographically best placed countries of the sample,
these two medium-sized regional states have always enjoyed a greater
ability to integrate into the extraregional world, even though, until recently,
this world consisted of little more than the intermittent but strong pulling
force of the United States. At least since the presidency of Alberto Fujimori
(1990–2000), Peru has strived to strengthen economic and political links
with the superpower. Above all, Fujimori played the cards of drug traf-
ﬁcking and terrorism to obtain US foreign aid and support on debt relief
(St. John 2011, 123). Trade relations were mainly conducted through the
unilateral and non-reciprocal Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), enac-
ted in 1991, and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA) of 2002, both of which also included other Andean countries.
During the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, however, while the Toledo administration
(2001–06) continued cultivating Peru’s special relationship with the United
States, this time by subscribing to a bilateral FTA, it also turned the country
towards the region by concluding a strategic alliance with Brazil. Along
with the main goal of launching a new-generation regionalism project, this
alliance also included important bilateral trade and investment agreements
(St. John 2011, 126). Toledo’s intention of making another turn, this time
to the Asia-Paciﬁc region, could not fully materialize until the García
administration (2006–11), in which we witness a dramatic move towards
the proliferation of extraregional alignments, which started with a strategic
partnership between Peru and China in 2008, followed shortly thereafter by
a bilateral FTA between those two nations, signed in 2009. In addition to
these new political and trade linkages with China, Peru also received
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funding for large mining projects, drawing up to 4.4 billion USD in Chinese
investments. At almost the same time as it weaved these special bonds with
the Asian giant, Peru negotiated two further bilateral FTAs with Singapore
and Canada (both signed in 2008 and in force by 2009). A bundle of
additional FTAs came shortly thereafter, this time with Thailand and South
Korea (2009–11), the EFTA countries (2010–12), and Japan, Mexico,
Panama, and Costa Rica (throughout the 2011–12 period).13 Hence, of the
countries examined, Peru undoubtedly constitutes the most striking case of
a complete turnaround in foreign policy towards a multi-vectorial strategy
of international insertion.
Even though Colombia enjoys a better international position than Peru, it
did not espouse in practice the same impetus towards an increasing diver-
siﬁcation of extraregional linkages that many of its peers did. Both the
legacy of decades of economic, military, and political dependency on the
United States and the heavy weight that internal insurgency and the culti-
vation of illegal narcotics traditionally bore on the formulation of foreign
policy still seemed to loom large in Colombian foreign policymaking
throughout the 2000s. The Uribe administration (2002–10), with its focus
on defeating insurgency, only contributed to exacerbate these trends
(Randall 2011). However, since the Santos administration took ofﬁce in
August 2010, most analysts have tended to converge on the view that
Colombia’s foreign policy is beginning to show more traces of change than
continuity (Pastrana Buelvas and Vera Piñeros 2012; Palacio 2014). To
start with, a general desecuritization of the country’s external relations is
being brought forward as the basis for a broader strategy of ‘thematic and
geographic diversiﬁcation’. These new guiding principles, captured by
Colombian strategists as respice omnia (‘look to all’) – in substitution of the
respice polum (‘look to the north’), which dominated Colombian foreign
policy until recently (Palacio 2014) – are enshrined in the National Devel-
opment Plan 2010–14 as well as reﬂected in multiple public speeches by
President Santos (Pastrana Buelvas and Vera Piñeros 2012, 72; Ramírez
2011, 80). Yet, as already mentioned, though at the discursive level
Colombia seems to ﬁt with the increasingly prevalent strategic thinking in
South America, in practice its diversiﬁcation activities have been more
13 Cross-regional bilateral FTAs, also known as ‘cross-regionalism’ (Crawford and
Fiorentino 2005; Tovias 2008), have been one of the instruments of economic diplomacy that
South American states have used to diversify their economic relations. Up to 2005, there was only
eight of these bilateral agreements signed by a South American state and an extraregional partner,
all of them by Chile; by 2015 they were already 40 distributed among four South American
signatories (own calculations based on data from the Organization of American States Foreign
Trade Information System (SICE 2016)).
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modest than those of its neighbours, as Colombia’s foreign endeavours
remain overly concentrated in the Americas – as the FTAs signed with the
United States (2006–12) and Canada (2008–11) testify – and because the
country is only timidly looking for new spaces in the extraregional world.
Although it has already signed an FTA with South Korea, the Colombian
strategy of insertion into the Asia-Paciﬁc region has been, unlike its South
American peers, prominently multilateral, primarily characterized by its
seeking of membership in APEC. Bilaterally, Colombia is only beginning to
establish political and economic linkages with those extraregional states that
form what has become known as the CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa), a group of countries with rapidly
growing economies and similar international standings, but just beneath
the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in terms of size (Ramírez
2011, 90). An FTA with Turkey is already in the negotiation phase.
Bolivia and Ecuador
Being, or perceiving themselves to be, more vulnerable to the risks of
negotiating trade agreements with much more powerful players, Bolivia
and Ecuador have so far refrained from emulating the extent of Peru’s
strategy of commercial diversiﬁcation.14 However, this has not prevented
these two countries from having avidly turned to a varied number of
extraregional powers, including China, Russia, Iran, and France, arguably
to attain two key foreign policy goals: to diminish their traditional depen-
dency on the United States while still getting the investments they need to
exploit their large endowment of natural resources. Thus, counting on the
availability of alternative sources of investment, Ecuador and Bolivia have
both actively tried to distance themselves from the United States. Ecuador
chose not to renew an agreement giving the United States access to a
military base on its soil, and Bolivia has gone further by expelling the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the United
States Agency for International Development from the country and sus-
pending ofﬁcial diplomatic relations. As a result of this policy, Bolivia lost
the beneﬁts from the ATPDEA and ATPA, which gave it preferential access
to the US market (Mathis 2009, 4). In June 2013, Ecuador followed suit
by unilaterally renouncing the same agreements (El Universo 2013).
Interestingly, this policy of ‘cutting ties’ with the United States has not, as
one might expect, been accompanied by a bandwagoning policy towards
the regional power, Brazil. On the contrary, both countries have re-signed
contracts and nationalized stocks of the Brazilian oil company Petrobras.
14 Ecuador, however, has recently signed a FTA with the European Union (on July 2014).
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In November 2008, Ecuador further repudiated a debt it incurred with
Brazil’s development bank BNDES for the construction of a hydroelectric
plant and expelled the Brazilian company responsible for the project.
Bolivia later proceeded similarly by cancelling a contract with the BNDES
and the Brazilian construction company OAS in January 2013 (Latin
American Security & Strategic Review 2008, 10).
Bolivia and Ecuador have found the resources necessary to pursue these
policies in their own region as much as in the extraregional world. Whereas
regionally, both states have engaged in the alternative regional project
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty
(ALBA-TCP) – wherein they have found the opportunity to draw on
resources of the oil-rich ‘secondary’ regional power, Venezuela, which
granted these states generous trade and energy concessions – extraregional
powers have eventually come to ﬁll the empty slot left by either the United
States or Brazil. In Ecuador, the re-signing of contracts with Petrobras has
also meant the entry of the Chinese companies Andes Petroleum, Sinopec,
and PetroOriental. China has also lent the Ecuadorian government up to
seven billion USD and is currently constructing a self-ﬁnanced two billion
USD 1.5GW hydroelectric plant (Ellis 2009, 10; Agostinis 2013, 510).
Russia, meanwhile, signed a strategic partnership on trade and security
cooperation with Ecuador on the occasion of the ﬁrst visit of an Ecuadorian
president to Moscow, in October 2009. Initially, Russia issued the Andean
country a 200 million USD concessional loan for military procurements
(Bonet 2009). Later, in November 2013, during another high-level visit to
Russia, Ecuadorian authorities secured Russian funding for the construc-
tion of several renewable energy plants worth 1.5 billion USD (Latin
American Andean Group Report 2013, 7). In Bolivia, the Russian state-
owned oil company Gazprom is part of a 4.5 billion USD joint venture
together with the French Total and the Bolivian Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) for gas and oil exploration (Latin American
Weekly Report 2009, 4). China, Russia, Venezuela, and Brazil are separately
providing Bolivia with the crucial technical assistance and military hardware
it needs to continue its ﬁght against drugs since the departure of the DEA
(Mathis 2009, 5; Fox 2012). Although Iran and Ecuador have held various
high-level conversations on defense and energy cooperation, the Middle
Eastern regional power has gained a stronger foothold in Bolivia, with which
it has established a mechanism for political consultation and an industrial
cooperation accord including one billion USD for investments, mainly to help
strengthen YPFB (Latin American Andean Group Report 2007, 8).
This survey of ‘least likely’ South American cases suggests that irrespec-
tive of the ideological inclinations of the different administrations, there is a
general convergence towards a certain type of strategic thinking that
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advises diversiﬁcation of political and economic linkages with a preferably
wide range of extraregional actors. Small South American states are not
confronted with a situation, in which they have few alternatives but to seek
integration with the local regional (great) power as a regiopolar scenario
would expect. Quite the contrary, their behaviour shows how, at the unit
level, perceptions of changes, and the opening of new opportunities in the
international system have motivated sometimes outright reconsiderations
of traditional foreign policy practices.
The demise of the ‘new regionalism’ in South America
In this section I show that, contrary to the expectations of a regiopolarity
scenario, the emergence of a multipolar political economy has been rather
detrimental to the development and stability of (moderately) deep or tight
forms of economic regionalism. This was the case of the South American
region. In the early 1990s, South American states started to subscribe to
complex forms of economic regionalism as their main strategy of interna-
tional insertion by relaunching or creating new regional organizations such
as the Andean Pact (relaunched in 1991 and renamed Andean Community
(AC) in 1996) and the CommonMarket of the South (Mercosur), created in
1991. Both of these regionalist schemes had the ultimate goal of establish-
ing a common market and constituted paradigmatic instances of open
regionalism, as they were designed to make their member states more
competitive in the world economy. With varying emphases, they pursued a
mixed institutional strategy of intergovernmentalism and supranational
integration to attain their goals.15 Having been conceptualized as forming
part of the third wave of regionalism (also known as the ‘new regionalism’),
they remained relatively stable for nearly 15 years.
Today, however, most observers of Latin American politics would agree
that these regionalist schemes are undergoing a deep crisis or have, at best,
stagnated in recent years (Sanahuja 2008–09, 13; Phillips and Prieto 2011;
Malamud and Gardini 2012). Different explanations have been proposed
to account for this decline. While some pundits have emphasized the role of
endogenous variables,16 others have begun to point to external variables
and to identify a ‘propensity of emerging powers towards bilateralism’
15 The AC has developed a number of supranational institutions such as a commission, a
parliament, and a court of justice, while Mercosur has only established a supranational dispute
settlement body.
16 For instance, the limits imposed by a low degree of intraregional trade in creating sufﬁcient
demand-side conditions for further integration (Burges 2005), ﬂaws in the institutional design of
these regional organizations (Malamud and Schmitter 2011, 151–54), or the volatile behaviour
of regional powers (Krapohl et al. 2014).
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(Malamud and Gardini 2012, 128–29) or an ‘increasingly pronounced
tension between regionalist strategies and global priorities’ (Phillips and
Prieto 2011, 121) but without really ﬂeshing out what these variables
consist of or why they operate in the way they do. Unlike this literature,
I am not concerned here in accounting for the overall crisis of these regional
schemes. Instead, what I brieﬂy show is how the policies of established
extraregional powers towards the region and the entrance of new (rising)
powers into the regional scene have proved decisive in disrupting de facto
the basic commitments supposed to sustain a strategy of open regionalism
by giving individual states strong incentives to renege on the rules of
cooperation in place since the 1990s – namely, the collective negotiation of
trade agreements and the coordination of a common external tariff.
The AC, the direct successor of the Andean Pact of 1969, started to function
as open regionalism at least since 1993–94, when the free trade area and the
common external tariff entered into operation. By the end of the ﬁrst decade of
the 21st century, however, this strategywas foundering as somemember states
decided to go it alone and negotiate individually with a number of large
extraregional partners, thereby making the AC’s common external tariff part
of the negotiations with non-member parties. A ﬁrst assault on this regional
scheme came from the north. After failing to persuade South American states
to form the continent-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the
United States decided to resort to a selective bilateral strategy to engage the
region ﬁrst by negotiating and signing a FTA with Chile. Yet, Chile was not
taking part in any open regionalist scheme at the time. The same year this
agreement came into force (2004), however, the United States repeated the
exercise and started bilateral FTA negotiations with two key AC member
states, Peru and Colombia. Both sets of negotiations concluded in 2006, and
the corresponding FTAs came into effect in 2009 and 2012, respectively. At
almost the same time, a pulling force from the east emerged, as China
attempted to brace its rapidly growing volume of trade with Latin America by
seeking to establish bilateral FTAs. The ﬁrst of them, signed with Chile,
entered into force in 2006. A second FTA came into force in 2010, this time
with a member state of the AC, Peru. Meanwhile, an additional FTA with AC
member Colombia is said to be currently under discussion.17 Perhaps in fear of
being left behind the United States and China, the European Union forewent
its interregional, bloc-to-bloc negotiation approach and signed bilateral FTAs
with Colombia and Peru in 2011 – both of which came into effect in 2013.18
17 There are also rumours that China and Ecuador are studying the feasibility of a FTA.
18 The growing trade volume between China and Latin America is already threatening to
displace the EU to third in the list of Latin America’s most important trade partners after the
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Mercosur, created in 1991 along the strategic lines of open regionalism,
performed better in resisting extraregional temptations than its Andean
counterpart. However, it may be approaching the limits of its ability to
withstand such centrifugal forces as a bilateral EU–Brazil FTA seems likely to
follow anytime soon the strategic partnership already signed by both parties
in 2007. Indeed, after more than a decade of discontinuous and ultimately
unfulﬁlled interregional negotiations for a comprehensive EU–Mercosur trade
agreement, Brazil seems about to succumb to the temptation of making the
most of its privileged bargaining position as the world’s seventh-largest
economy and as a special EU partner as evinced by its proposal in August
2013 to start negotiations over an FTAwith the EU.19 The future ofMercosur
was also a prominent topic in the last Brazilian presidential race, fought
between Dilma Rousseff (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and Aécio Neves
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira). Neves suggested replacing
Mercosur’s customs union with a free trade area that would allow Brazil to
conclude partnerships with countries with which it has economic com-
plementarities (Ruck Bueno 2014). However, judging by the behaviour of the
smaller Mercosur member states, these unilateral impulses of Brazil seem not
to be foreordained to transform Mercosur into a kind of ‘north–south
regionalism’ (Fernández and Portes 1998, 211), in which smaller states are left
in a difﬁcult bargaining position and with no other option but to loyally
adhere to the regional project in the hope of drawing some resources from
abroad. Instead, small Mercosur member states seem equally eager to pull
out. Uruguay, for instance, has unsuccessfully devoted much of its diplomatic
efforts to obtaining temporary authorization from Mercosur to conclude a
bilateral FTA with the United States. Likewise, in the midst of Paraguay’s
readmission to the regional bloc after its temporary suspension, the new
president Horacio Cartes called for Mercosur countries to be granted more
‘independence’ to look for new markets and negotiate agreements (Infobae
2013). Uruguay and Paraguay’s requests for observer status in the Paciﬁc
Alliance may be interpreted as another signal that they are facing similar
incentives as their Andean counterparts.
Thus, in less than a decade, the new way in which both established and
rising powers have engaged the region has practically dismantled the
United States and China. In 2012, China was already the main trade partner of Brazil, Peru,
and Chile.
19 Brazil’s growing preference for ‘going-it-alone’ is reﬂected in the words of former Brazilian
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota: ‘There are objective conditions that create strong incentives
for an advance on the EU–Mercosur front […] but there is also an anticipation that each
[Mercosur] country may be able to negotiate at separate speeds’ (quoted by Rathbone and Leahy
2013).
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operation of open regionalism in the AC and rolled it back to the earlier
stage of a free trade area – a regression from (moderately) deep to shallow
economic regionalism. Meanwhile, within Mercosur, the preferences of
most member states seem to be moving in the same direction: towards a
downgrading of the regional scheme to more shallow forms of economic
cooperation. Following Phillips and Prieto, it is therefore possible to con-
clude that the new regionalism ‘has essentially run aground as a force for
structural transformation of the political economy in Latin America’
(2011, 116).
While multipolarity has had these deleterious effect on the AC and Mer-
cosur, the new Latin American regional organizations that have appeared in
the last decade such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
(2008), ALBA-TCP (2004), the Community of Latin American and Car-
ibbean States (2011), and the Paciﬁc Alliance (2012) have all refrained from
following the main strategic lines of open regionalism. None of them requires
the coordination of common external tariffs and common negotiation posi-
tions in international trade negotiations. The Paciﬁc Alliance can be seen as
the posterchild of shallow economic regionalism, namely: a free trade area in
which member states have only to coordinate tariff rates among themselves.
What is more, supranational integration, or the delegation of ‘parcels of
sovereignty’ to supranational institutions, has been completely discarded by
all of them both as a model and as an aspiration.
What about other world regions?
For reason of space it is not possible here to evaluate whether the dynamics
of decentred multipolarity are having the same effects in other world
regions. However, aggregated empirical data shows that during the last
decade – a period widely viewed as having witnessed the emergence of new
economic powers – the same emerging states became in general less
important in shaping the regionalization dynamics of their own regions. It is
true that a relatively high level of regionalization is not a necessary condi-
tion for the emergence of complex forms of economic regionalism. For
instance, open regionalism required relatively complex policy coordination
for the sole purpose of improving the bargaining position of member states
in their interactions with extraregional actors. In general, however, fol-
lowing Mattli’s logic of regional integration, the less signiﬁcant regional
exchanges become, the less attractive the economic gains of regionalism
relative to the political costs that regional economic policy coordination
always implies.
For instance, using ‘regional introversion indices’ to measure the degree
of trade regionalization, economists Iapadre and Tajoli (2014, 95–97)
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identiﬁed a ‘common and pronounced downward trend of regional intro-
version’ between 1995 and 2011 in Mercosur, the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS), the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China (ASEAN+China).20
Particularly eye-catching are the declines observed in CIS and SAFTA.Within
CIS, regional trade introversion has fallen continuously since 1995, a time at
which member states traded almost exclusively among themselves. The
downward trend continued until the last year of observation (2011), despite
the ﬁnancial crisis in extraregional export markets and, more interestingly, the
relative recovery of the Russian Federation as a regional power throughout
the last decade.21 Within SAFTA, regional trade introversion dropped
dramatically: in 2011 was only one-third of what it was in 1995.
Shifting the focus to the role of emerging powers within their own
regions – speciﬁcally, the question whether these states represent a hub
around which regional trade networks are organized – by using network
analysis, Iapadre and Tajoli measured the degree of centrality of China,
India, Brazil, and Russia in ASEAN, SAFTA, Mercosur, and CIS, respec-
tively.22 Their most interesting ﬁnding is that whereas the centrality of these
emerging powers with respect to the global trade network has increased
signiﬁcantly in the last decade, this is not the case within their home regions.
Instead, they found a marked decrease in the importance of Brazil and
Russia as outlet markets for their respective neighbours’ exports. Within
SAFTA, the above-mentioned drop of trade introversion was also accom-
panied by a downward trend in the regional centrality of India (Iapadre and
Tajoli 2014, 101–06). With the exception of China, emerging powers seem
to be consolidating as ‘local suppliers’ for their regions, and despite being
well-connected exporters within the global economy, they are not ‘regional
hubs’ in the sense of absorbing the produce of smaller neighbours to
transform them into ﬁnal goods directed towards global markets.23 Instead,
20 The indicator was proposed by Iapadre (2006); it measures ‘in relative terms to what extent
a region’s member countries tend to trade among each other more intensively than with third
countries’ (Iapadre and Tajoli 2014, 94).
21 Russia, however, actually relaunched regional economic cooperation in 2000 through the
creation of the Eurasian Economic Community out of six CIS states (Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). This redeﬁnition of the regional bound-
aries by Russia would probably alter the results of the study.
22 The measures of centrality are eigenvector centrality (which measures the importance of a
node in terms of its connections to other central nodes), authority centrality (whether a country is
important in the network as an import destination), and hub centrality (whether a country’s
exports are directed to many important destinations) (Iapadre and Tajoli 2014, 99).
23 A regional export hub ‘plays a dominant role in the trade of its regional partners, but
exhibits a more intense orientation towards the rest of the world’, making the regional power’s
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the inputs that feed their export role come predominantly from the extra-
regional world. Ultimately, the authors concluded that ‘the larger country
in each region in terms of economic size and sheer trade volume is not
always also the main attractor of the region’s trade ﬂows, or the centre of
the regional trade structure’ (Iapadre and Tajoli 2014, 107).
In another study, economists Chen and De Lombaerde (2014) looked at a
different pair of important indicators revealing trends in patterns of interna-
tional exchange affecting the conﬁguration of regional spaces. First, the
authors brought forward an indicator of regional powers’ ‘hubness’ that aims
to capture the ‘degree of relative market interdependence’ between a regional
power and its smaller neighbours,24 and used it to measure the evolution
between 2000 and 2010 of the relative market dependence on Brazil, Russia,
India, and China of their respective home regions, institutionally deﬁned as
UNASUR, CIS, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),
and ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea), respectively.
Their ﬁndings were mixed, showing that only ASEAN+3 signiﬁcantly
increased its relative market dependence on Chinese imports and exports.
Within SAARC, the small landlocked states of Bhutan and Nepal also rein-
forced their traditional dependence on India in the time period, less so Sri
Lanka, the Maldives (by an increment of <0.1) and Afghanistan (<0.2). The
South Asian secondary regional powers, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, success-
fully resisted the pull of the Indianmarket and havemaintained their historical
marginal levels of exchange with India. Within UNASUR and CIS, however,
regional states were generally more dependent on Brazil and Russia, respec-
tively, in 2000 than they were in 2010. This reveals an overall decrease of
these regions’ relative market dependency on their regional powers during the
ﬁrst decade of this century. In South America, only Bolivia shows an increase
>0.1 points, whereas Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina
all reduced their reliance on the Brazilian market. Within the post-Soviet
space, the only country that became more dependent on the Russian market
was Ukraine (Chen and De Lombaerde 2014, 122).
importance as a destination market for the smaller regional states greater than its reliance on
intraregional exports. ‘This can be the result of regional production networks, in which ﬁnal
products made of inputs produced in different spokes are exported by the hub country to the rest
of the world’ (Iapadre and Tajoli 2014, 92, 95).
24 The formula employed by Chen and De Lombaerde is as follows: HMAB = EXAB×
(1− IMAB), ‘where HMAB measures the “hubness” of nation B from nation A’s point of view.
EXAB shows exports from A to B as a share of A’s total exports, and IMAB is B’s imports from A
as a share of its total imports. The value of the hubness measure ranges from 0 to 1. The closer the
value to 1, the deeper the dependence of A’s exports on B’s market’ (Chen and De Lombaerde
2014, 121).
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The same authors looked also at the evolution of the degree of globalization
of regional powers (measured by the KOF Globalization Index25) against the
backdrop of the average level of globalization of their regional neighbours. In
this respect, a revealing indicator of regional scenarios moving towards the
formation of hub-and-spoke structures would be to see regional powers fea-
turing a considerably higher degree of globalization and globalizing at a faster
pace than their neighbours. However, data from 1990 to 2009 shows that
even when regional powers displayed slightly higher levels of globalization
than their home regions, overall neighbours globalized at a similar pace to
their regional powers. In the case of South America, Brazil’s level and pace of
globalization were almost identical to that of the rest of UNASUR (Chen and
De Lombaerde 2014, 123–24). Last, Chen and De Lombaerde’s study
corroborates Iapadre and Tajoli’s results by also ﬁnding that the increased
participation of these regional powers in global markets does not induce them
to import more products from their regions; instead, they source inputs from
extraregional suppliers, thereby reducing their role in intraregional trade to
that of ‘local suppliers’ (Chen and De Lombaerde 2014, 125–26).
What is causing this overall decrease in several indicators of regionali-
zation in most of the home regions (with the possible exception of China’s)
of the BRIC countries? Could it be ascribed to an intensiﬁcation of
‘globalization’, possibly to a drop in transportation and communication
costs, as one pair of authors suggests (Iapadre and Tajoli 2014). In thinking
about ‘globalization’, however, it is important to distinguish between two
concepts or set of variables that are often blended together but that sepa-
rately have the potential to affect the conﬁguration of regions, namely
‘globalization’ and ‘internationalization’. According to Katzenstein (2005,
13–17), while globalization refers to new developments that ‘transcends
space and compresses time’ such as transport and telecommunication
technologies and to the emergence or empowerment of new players such as
corporations with the capacity to reorganize global production networks,
internationalization refers to ‘territorially based exchanges across borders
[…to the] continued relevance of existing actors and the intensiﬁcation of
existing relations […] Internationalisation is thus an eminently political
process in which different actors seek to exploit asymmetric power relations
to their advantage […] Internationalisation describes processes that
reafﬁrm nation-states as the basic actors in the international system’. In
other words, internationalization refers to the political drivers, to states’
strategic decisions that may spur (or not) globalization in a wider sense.
25 The KOF Index of Globalization considers economic, social, and political variables. For a
detailed account of the criteria and weights, see Dreher et al. (2008).
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Economists have mostly centred their attention on the ﬁrst set of vari-
ables (globalization in Katzenstein’s ﬁrst sense) without being able to ﬁnd a
satisfactory explanation. For instance, by seeking to account for the sub-
stantial growth of trade among developing countries (which, judging by the
ﬁndings listed above, do not seem to be clustering on a regional basis),
Hanson (2012)26 concluded that falling trade costs, as predicted by stan-
dard gravity models such as the reduction of tariff barriers, the fall of
transport costs, or the expansion of WTO membership, are insufﬁcient on
their own to explain why trade-to-GDP ratios have risen so much in
low- and middle-income countries.27 In the same vein, Hummels (2007)
provided evidence that the costs of ocean shipping have not decreased
signiﬁcantly during the period of observation. Variables of the same sort,
such as the expansion of multistage global production networks or the
emergence of a ﬁner degree of international specialization, can also tell only
part of the story (Hanson 2012, 56–60).
In view of these inconclusive ﬁndings, the role played by inter-
nationalization variables in producing part of the results obtained by the
aforementioned studies should not be discounted, especially when
internationalization strategies have recently took the form of different types
of rapidly proliferating north–south and south–south cooperation agree-
ments (including new strategic partnerships, bilateral FTAs, and other
kinds of hybrid intergovernmental arrangements) between states belonging
to different world regions.28 These agreements involve governments’
purposeful decisions to expand trade and other kinds of exchanges
with selected partner countries, and are also often the diplomatic instru-
ments of choice through which powerful states project their economic
26 Hanson found that, between 1994 and 2008, the share of exports from low-income
countries going to low- and middle-income markets rose from 24 to 42%, while the share of
exports frommiddle-income countries going to low- and middle-income markets rose from 33 to
46%. Within the same period, other middle-income countries absorbed 50% or more of middle-
income–country export growth.
27 Between 1994 and 2008, exports over GDP rose from 26 to 55% in low-income countries
and from 25 to 55% in middle-income countries (Hanson 2012, 43).
28 The difference between strategic partnerships designed to open new channels of political
cooperation, and purely preferential or FTAs is sometimes not just of kind but of degree. This is
partly because new-generation bilateral FTAs contain provisions on interstate cooperation that
go beyond those policy areas usually covered by the WTO multilateral agenda. It is also because
hybrid instruments referring to both economic and political issues have recently emerged. Taking
into account only cross-regional agreements dealing with trade (most of them bilateral), WTO
data reveals that they have mushroomed during the last decade to represent half of all preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) that were in force by 2010. This proliferation has taken place
predominantly alongside the north–south and south–south cardinal lines (see WTO 2011,
58–61).
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power overseas.29 If these new internationalization dynamics are
contributing in part to the overall decreasing regionalization indices
observed in several world regions, this may be an indicator that decentred
multipolarity is affecting other world regions in the same way, as we have
seen, it affects South America.
Conclusions
As Fawcett (2008) has showed, the development of regionalism has never
been linear and sustained but has instead waxed and waned according to
the international environment, to which regionalism itself has usually been
a strategic adaptive response. The literature of the ‘new regionalism’ has
repeatedly highlighted that the international conditions prevalent during
the early years of the post-Cold War era have been remarkably favourable
for the development and expansion of world regionalism. However, this
might be set about to change. As I attempted to demonstrate, distinctive
system–region dynamics, or what I called ‘decentred multipolarity’ –
namely, the parallel emergence of new economic powers and the latter’s
increasing preference for projecting their newly gained economic power to
distant regions, on one hand, and the change that this new perceived
international environment produces in the cost–beneﬁt calculations
informing the strategies of international insertion of smaller states, on the
other – are shaping a world in which economic and political interstate
relations are not clustering regionally, much less forming hub-and-spoke
structures around the material preponderance of local regional (great)
powers, but are instead increasingly transcending the various regions’
geopolitical boundaries in all directions in which regional actors manage to
link up with extraregional poles. These patterns are certainly not com-
pletely new inmultipolar regions like East Asia or theMiddle East, but seem
counterintuitive in regions that have historically exhibited different forms
of hierarchical ordering structures as I showed was the case of South
America. A detailed analysis of similarly structured unipolar regions such as
South Asia or the post-Soviet space would certainly arrive to similar con-
clusions as suggested by both regions’ decreasing regionalization indexes.
The theoretical implication is that contrary to the international condi-
tions prevalent during the 1990s, this new environment is more hostile to
the development of complex forms of so-called (moderately) ‘deep’ or
‘tight’ economic regionalism, such as regional supranational integration
29 For instance, the surge in south–south trade is strongly correlated with the increase of PTAs
among developing countries – which by 2010 already represented two-thirds of all notiﬁed and
non-notiﬁed PTAs in force (WTO 2011, 55–56).
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and open regionalism, in which a more or less stable structure of incentives
is expected to sustain a relatively complex policy coordination game among
regional states on the supply side of integration. An emergent multipolar
system resembling the decentred multipolarity model is likely to adversely
affect precisely this set of variables, thereby making the pursuit of this kind
of regionalist strategies less likely to succeed. This applies especially, but not
exclusively,30 to the global south, where regionalism has traditionally been
the result of supply-side forces. In these areas, we can expect an emergent
decentred multipolar constellation to affect these forms of regionalism
more severely as I shown already had in South America. In light of these
ﬁndings, I agree with Malamud and Gardini’s (2012, 125) contention that
‘the world is not going the regional way’ and that ‘further deepening of
regionalism in Latin America [and elsewhere] is not to be expected’.
Economic regionalism will, of course, not vanish from world politics, but
an increasingly multipolar constellation is likely to carve it in new forms:
more ﬂexible, shallow, and porous.
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